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Introduction: Transnational
Corporate Concentration-The
Issues
THOMAS E. KAUPER
Competition policy in the United States, particularly re-
flected in antitrust policy, in recent years has focused on corporate structure.
To some, this emphasis simply reflects a belief in a close correlation between
corporate structure and behavior. A single firm monopoly inevitably will re-
strict output and raise prices above levels that would prevail under competi-
tion conditions, distorting allocative efficiency. The behavioral pattern is a
direct consequence of structure.' Many believe that high corporate concen-
tration, even short of single firm monopoly, is at least conducive to, if not a
cause of, monopolistic behavior.2 Some also view high corporate concentra-
tion, and the aggregation of economic as well as political and social power
identified with it, as a threat to democratic institutions and individual liberty.
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Not surprisingly, there are dissenters who view high corporate concentration
in particular markets as facilitating successful collusive behavior, but of no
necessary competitive consequence.4 The latter view focuses simply on behav-
ior. The relationship between corporate concentration and behavior is thus
not clearly understood, and is the subject of vigorous debate in the United
States. Of course, this debate is directly relevant to the need for, and con-
tours of, government policy directed toward control of concentration. Anti-
trust policy directed toward concentration, and particularly mergers that di-
rectly increase concentration, is at the heart of the controversy.
The articles in this volume carry the debate a step further. As corporate
enterprises extend their activities across international boundaries, so too,
problems of corporate concentration take on an international quality. New
issues come to the fore. Is transnational corporate concentration an identifi-
able problem that presents policy issues beyond those posed by concentration
measured in particular national markets? If there is a separate problem, can
it be sufficiently defined to formulate an intelligent public policy response?
And are there now, or in the future likely to be, national or international
control mechanisms capable of implementing any such policy intiatives?
Thomas E. Kauper is a professor of law at the University of Michigan and the former
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Justice Department.
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This volume presents the views of scholars, government and international
organization officials, and private practitioners, on these questions. The
reader will not find a consensus, either on the nature of the problem or on
any proposed solution. But hopefully the exchange will contribute to the
public discussion which is already well under way, and provide valuable
insights to those who must bear the responsibility for policy formulation.
Many of the issues to be discussed in this volume are unresolved. This is
not because they are unimportant, for it is abundantly clear that they are of
extraordinary significance. But they are issues on the frontier of both legal
development and international relations. They are also issues which tend to
provoke emotional responses and assertions of very strong national interests.
The very word multinational, a word that we now manage to avoid to some
extent, tends to evoke images of corporate giants operating on such a large
international scale that they are for all practical purposes beyond the control
of any national authority. The multinational problem, as some describe this
absence of unified control, relates, to the extent that we can define any
problem at all, to a number of public policy concerns ranging from formula-
tion of tax policy to concerns about full employment. The focus in this vol-
ume will be primarily upon competition policy and the need to preserve free
and open markets.
Within the context of corporate enterprises operating across one or more
national boundaries, the initial issues will relate to the degree of danger to
competition such enterprises create. Do they pose a peculiar threat to competi-
tion in national markets? Indeed, is it even realistic to think in terms of na-
tional markets? If such a threat can be identified, what remedies might pre-
sently be available? If these remedies are inadequate, for jurisdictional or other
reasons, what sort of mechanisms might be capable of assuring an adequate
measure of international control? These questions are all obviously interre-
lated. If multinational enterprises pose a particular danger to free markets, it is
either because they have a power not common to domestic businesses, or be-
cause national policies, implemented in a variety of ways, are not capable of
checking the exercise of that power because it transcends national bounda-
ries. An assessment of the effectiveness of national control mechanisms in
dealing with multinational enterprises thus is central to the determination that
such enterprises pose a peculiar competitive problem calling for additional na-
tional or international control mechanisms. This conference focused on the
competitive threat, if any, caused by the enterprises operating on a large inter-
national scale and on the need for additional means to assure their control.
Several articles in this volume focus on national efforts to deal with
corporate concentration in terms of competition policy. An examination of
such efforts is useful both in determining whether there is any broad-scale
consensus on the competitive effects of concentration, and in evaluating the
need for further national or international remedies. In the United States, for
example, antitrust control of mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act has
been sufficiently severe that significant mergers between competing firms,
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the category of mergers which most directly increase concentration, seldom
occur.' Merger policy clearly reflects a direct concern with concentration in
purely structural terms. But other nations view concentration within their
domestic markets differently, and may go so far as to promote mergers
which, while significantly increasing concentration, are thought to promote
efficiency. The French policy, for example, seems far more in accord with
the latter approach than with that followed in the United States. The long-
standing effort within the European Economic Community to develop a
merger control guideline acceptable to member nations, an effort still largely
unsuccessful, reflects the difficulty of accommodating such divergent views.
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It will readily become apparent that there is little consensus over the
nature of the problem or the need for, or nature of, a solution. Empirical data
on concentration and its effects, both in national markets and internationally,
is lacking. Different nations start, therefore, with different data bases, mak-
ing comparisons difficult. More importantly, the international community
lacks consensus not only over what competition is, but also over its desirabil-
ity. Aggressive competition to one nation is ruinous to another. Competition
policy may, to some, include what to others are trade policy concerns. The
concern of underdeveloped nations with the need for "antitrust" rules to
govern parent-subsidiary relationships is but one example. Concerns over
national sovereignty may dictate noncompetitive results, particularly where
state-owned enterprises are involved. There is thus no consensus over the
standards by which the problems, if any, can be identified and measured.
The same lack of consensus causes different national authorities to focus on
different problems. Conflict necessarily results. This absence of consensus
today makes any international solution difficult, if not impossible.
Related to the identification of competitive concerns about transnational
concentration is an assessment of the adequacy of existing national rem-
edies. National antitrust authorities in some countries, particularly in the
United States, have not been wanting, at least for effort, in protecting their
own interests and markets from conduct undertaken outside their own boun-
daries. But how far can such authorities reach? The application of extraterri-
torial principles has resulted in increasingly vocal protest, both from affected
business enterprises and from sovereigns who view their own interests quite
differently. This simply reflects, in part, the lack of consensus alluded to
earlier. It also reflects concern over national sovereignty and a nation's need
to control conduct within its own geographic boundaries. Assuming a na-
tion's ability to apply extraterritorial principles to specific conduct, how rele-
vant are those principles to matters of structure if structure is in fact the
ultimate determinant of behavior? The difficulty of dealing with structure in
one or more countries in order to eliminate concomitant behavioral effects in
another is obvious. The result may well be that the country in which effects
are felt has little real choice but to deal only with the behavioral symptoms.
Mergers might afford the best example. Mergers can affect structure,
and thus competition, on an international scale. But how far may any national
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authority go in dealing with mergers beyond its own boundary? Sovereigns in
whose territory one or more of the merging partners is located may view the
merger as procompetitive within their own national markets. Or the merger
may be viewed as serving some other public need, such as full employment
or technological growth, which in the view of that nation makes the transac-
tion desirable, even if anticompetitive. Not all nations, after all, value compe-
tition as highly as the United States. An attempt on an extraterritorial basis to
prohibit the merger thus provokes sovereign conflict, conflict which might
mean either that no action is taken, or that the nation whose policy is of-
fended can at best regulate the behavior of the merged firm within its own
territory. This conflict in national interests may manifest itself in a variety of
ways. Nations objecting to the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws
of others may take steps to block investigative efforts by antitrust authorities
of other nations within their territory or of their nationals, perhaps even to
the point of legislatively directing noncooperation.7 Judicial relief orders that
require action or attempt to regulate behavior in another nation can be ob-
structed or even formally blocked by the latter. The relief problem is particu-
larly acute in dealing with mergers, where implementation of a decree re-
quiring divestiture abroad would be at issue. Several articles in this volume
consider such practical questions.
To a substantial degree, conflicts of this sort reflect a lack of consensus
over the desirability of competition, and over the competitive consequences of
particular behavior. This gives the outsider the perception that multinational
enterprises are beyond the control of authorities who would like, but are
unable, to exert some degree of control. In reality, however, the fundamental
issue is a lack of agreement on the need for such control in the first instance.
Yet it is also true that where there is international agreement on the need to
deal with a particular act, or pattern of behavior, the ability of the affected
enterprise to use the multiplicity of interested national authorities to its own
advantage can operate to obstruct such efforts. From a national perspective,
an inability to reach such enterprises can also pose significant domestic
issues. Firms operating within a local market peopled in part by multina-
tional enterprises, and thus directly competitive with them, may perceive
what is in reality an inability to deal with these competitors as a form of
conscious favoritism. Political pressure may then be exerted to lessen the
severity of the antitrust rules applicable within the domestic market to permit
local firms to compete more effectively with multinational enterprises that
are thought, rightly or wrongly, not to be subject to the same rules.
For these reasons, among others, consideration is now being given to a
variety of international solutions, solutions predicated on the ineffectiveness
of piecemeal and often inconsistent national efforts. Guidelines, standards,
and even international enforcement mechanisms have been proposed. So far,
such efforts have been directed solely toward anticompetitive behavior. Can
the national interests of states with fundamentally different economic poli-
cies and concerns, some of whom deal through state-owned enterprises,
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some of whom do not, and some of whom are far less developed than others,
reach a sufficiently precise consensus on both the nature of the problem and
substantive remedial standards sufficiently precise to afford any promise of
workability? If no consensus can be reached with respect to behavior, how
less likely is it that concentration can ever be dealt with on an international
basis in structural terms? Standards which do reflect a consensus may be so
generalized as to be of little value. The discussion in this volume of the
efforts of the OECD' and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)9 to prepare international guidelines and standards
will focus on this kind of question, as well as on the utility of a voluntary
guideline approach which contains no real obligation and no enforcement
mechanism. To some, voluntary guidelines for corporate behavior are a cyni-
cal illusion, designed to alleviate pressure from underdeveloped nations with-
out in fact offering any real prospect of change. But conversely, if consensus
on a relatively specific set of guidelines can be achieved, the accomplishment
of the consensus alone may make the exercise meaningful.
Ultimately, however, the question of some new type of international
antitrust cooperation or even enforcement authority, must be addressed.
These questions themselves make the complexity of the answers obvious.
Clearly we do not know the answers. We are not sure we even know the
problem. Thus, the only realistic response may well be one of "time will tell."
Certainly, however, the issues to be discussed in this volume are both con-
temporary and evocative of controversy. The uranium cartel investigation,'
0
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) case, " the in-
dictment of Atlantic shipping companies,' 2 the proposed removal of the Inter-
national Air Transport Association's (IATA) U.S. antitrust immunity,' 3 all
actions under United States antitrust laws, have provoked strong interna-
tional protests. American firms doing business abroad continue to press for
antitrust immunity under our own antitrust laws for conduct abroad. They
also occasionally assert that competition policy of other sovereigns has been
applied against them in a discriminatory manner. At the same time, the
Congress of the United States continues to press for more far-reaching appli-
cation of our own statutes, and the Justice Department always seems to find
itself caught in the middle. Careful analysis and reflection outside the politi-
cal arena is necessary before new courses can be set. This volume is in-
tended to aid such deliberations.
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